SafePay ransomware (AA26-293A): the exploited CVEs, TTPs and IOCs to hunt
The joint FBI and CISA advisory on SafePay: five exploited edge and backup CVEs, the TTPs mapped to ATT&CK, the IOCs, and how to hunt for them.
Researched and drafted with AI assistance · reviewed by Prince

On 20 October 2026 the FBI, CISA and the US Secret Service, with Germany’s Landeskriminalamt Rheinland-Pfalz, the UK National Crime Agency and the North West Regional Organised Crime Unit, published #StopRansomware advisory AA26-293A on SafePay. The agencies say the group has hit at least 600 victims across several critical infrastructure sectors since August 2024, in North America, South America, Europe and Australia. The advisory names no individual sectors. What makes it worth your time is the detail: five exploited CVEs in VPN, firewall and backup products, a full ATT&CK mapping, and IOCs observed between November 2024 and August 2026, published with STIX files.
We’ve laid it out in the order you’d act on it: what to patch, what the intrusion looks like, then what to hunt for.
What is affected
SafePay doesn’t depend on one product. According to the advisory, initial access comes from exposed or brute-forced credentials, VPN access (the actors used IP addresses belonging to the Mullvad VPN service and phished account profiles), phishing, and automated exploitation of internet-facing systems. Five CVEs are named. The advisory groups the two Cisco ones as edge-device bugs reached after the actors had phished account profiles, and the other three as bugs exploited with automated scripts against internet-exposed systems.
| CVE | Product (per NVD / KEV) | What it is | NVD CVSS v3.1 | Added to KEV |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2020-3259 | Cisco ASA and FTD | Unauthenticated memory disclosure via the web services interface, only in certain AnyConnect and WebVPN configurations | 7.5, AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N | 15 Feb 2024 |
| CVE-2023-20269 | Cisco ASA and FTD | Remote access VPN flaw allowing credential brute force, or a clientless SSL VPN session with valid credentials | 9.1, AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N | 13 Sep 2023 |
| CVE-2023-27532 | Veeam Backup & Replication | Encrypted credentials in the configuration database can be obtained | 7.5, AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N | 22 Aug 2023 |
| CVE-2024-40711 | Veeam Backup & Replication | Deserialisation of untrusted data leading to unauthenticated remote code execution | 9.8, AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H | 17 Oct 2024 |
| CVE-2024-40766 | SonicWall SonicOS | Improper access control in management access; can also crash the firewall | 9.8, AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H | 9 Sep 2024 |
NVD lists the SonicOS bug as affecting Gen 5 and Gen 6 devices, and Gen 7 devices on SonicOS 7.0.1-5035 and older. For the Cisco and Veeam products, take affected and fixed versions from the vendor advisories linked on each NVD record; we haven’t reproduced them here.
Severity, and what the scores mean in practice
The advisory has no single score. The CVEs carry their own, and on NVD’s scoring all five are network-reachable, need no privileges and need no user interaction.
The scorers don’t all agree. For CVE-2023-20269, NVD rates it 9.1, while Cisco’s own score on the same record is 5.0 (AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:N/I:L/A:N). Cisco’s description explains why: the bug doesn’t bypass authentication, it lets an attacker guess credentials or use valid ones they already hold. For CVE-2024-40766, a secondary scorer on the NVD record gives 9.3 against NVD’s 9.8. Either way, these are bugs in the devices that sit between the internet and your domain, plus the server that holds your backups. That says more about priority than the decimal does.
Exploited in the wild
Yes. All five are in CISA’s Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalogue, with the dates in the table above, and AA26-293A states that SafePay actors exploit them. None is new; the most recent was added to KEV two years ago. If any of these is still unpatched on an internet-facing device, assume it’s been probed and work from there.
What an attacker gets, and what they need first
The edge bugs give different things. CVE-2020-3259 leaks device memory to an unauthenticated attacker. CVE-2023-20269 needs network reach to the remote access VPN, and either a credential list to brute-force or valid credentials already. CVE-2024-40766 is in SonicOS management access. On the Veeam side, CVE-2023-27532 hands over the encrypted credentials stored in the configuration database, and NVD’s description notes this can give access to the backup infrastructure hosts. CVE-2024-40711 is unauthenticated code execution.
Put together with the rest of the advisory, the chain runs like this. The actors get in through a VPN or exposed service with valid or brute-forced credentials, or through an exploited edge device. Then, inside the network, they:
- Escalate with a UAC bypass through a COM component.
- Take or create admin accounts.
- Disable security tools, including Windows Defender during RDP sessions.
- Move laterally with PsExec, WinRM, SMB and RDP.
- Stage and steal data.
- Stop the Volume Shadow Copy Service and reset the NAS that holds backups to factory settings; in some cases, delete the network-attached backups outright.
- Encrypt.
The advisory also says the actors sometimes changed users’ passwords so that legitimate staff couldn’t log in.
Encryption and extortion
Per the advisory, SafePay uses ChaCha20 for file encryption with RSA for key exchange, encrypting files fully or partially depending on type and size, and appends .SafePay to encrypted files. The ransom note goes on the desktop or in the root directory and points to a Tor chat portal where the victim logs in with an ID. The demand is a share of company revenue, paid in cryptocurrency. Representatives of the group make phone calls to pressure victims, and data from those who don’t pay goes on the group’s leak site. The binary may delete itself after encryption. The advisory doesn’t name the ransom note file, and neither do we.
The TTPs, mapped
The advisory maps more than twenty ATT&CK techniques. These are the ones you can hunt for most directly. We checked each ID on attack.mitre.org; tactic names are ATT&CK’s current ones.
| Tactic | Technique | What the advisory describes |
|---|---|---|
| Initial Access | T1133 External Remote Services | VPN and other remote access into the internal network |
| Initial Access | T1190 Exploit Public-Facing Application | The five CVEs above, via automated scripts |
| Credential Access | T1110 Brute Force | Password attacks against accounts |
| Persistence | T1136 Create Account | New accounts given admin rights |
| Privilege Escalation | T1548.002 Bypass User Account Control | Elevated process created through a COM component |
| Defense Impairment | T1685 Disable or Modify Tools | Security software, registry keys and updates disabled |
| Stealth | T1070.004 File Deletion | Intrusion files, possibly the ransomware itself, removed |
| Execution | T1569.002 Service Execution | PsExec for remote commands |
| Lateral Movement | T1021.001, T1021.002, T1021.006 | RDP, SMB admin shares, WinRM |
| Collection | T1560.001 Archive via Utility | 7-Zip, WinRAR |
| Exfiltration | T1048, T1567 | FTP, HTTP/S and similar; web services such as OneDrive |
| Impact | T1486, T1490 | Encryption; VSS stopped, NAS reset, backups deleted |
The tools the advisory names are mostly legitimate: 7-Zip, WinRAR, FileZilla, RClone, WinSCP, AnyDesk, TeamViewer, ScreenConnect, PsExec, OneDrive, Acronis Disk Director, NetExec, and the Backblaze B2 client b2.exe. Next to them sit Mimikatz, ShareFinder.ps1 and SharpShares.exe for share discovery, and Socks.exe as a SOCKS proxy. The advisory is explicit that legitimate tools in its tables shouldn’t be treated as malicious without analytical evidence of misuse. That’s the right instinct: AnyDesk on a helpdesk laptop is normal; AnyDesk appearing on a file server the week of a Mullvad VPN login isn’t.
How to detect exposure and compromise
Exposure
Start with the five CVEs. Inventory every Cisco ASA or FTD with remote access VPN or WebVPN enabled, every SonicWall with management access reachable from the internet, and every Veeam Backup & Replication server, then check each against the vendor’s fixed versions. Look at the VPN authentication logs too. Cisco’s description of CVE-2023-20269 involves brute-forcing credentials through default connection profiles, so failed-login bursts against those profiles are worth a search, and the advisory specifically names Mullvad exit addresses as an access source.
Network indicators
The advisory lists nine IPs. It’s careful to say they may be cloud-hosted and reassigned, so treat them as historical and check against current telemetry before blocking. On shared cloud addresses a hit proves little by itself. Use them to search logs from the observation window (November 2024 to August 2026), not as a live blocklist.
| IP (defanged) | Advisory’s description |
|---|---|
| 104.26.2[.]223 | SafePay victim intrusion |
| 140.82.114[.]4 | SafePay victim intrusion |
| 185.199.108[.]133 | SafePay victim intrusion |
| 77.37.49[.]40 | SafePay victim intrusion |
| 173.194.194[.]94 | Hosting victim data |
| 167.235.225[.]149 | Client login panels |
| 5.255.11[.]134 | Used in exfiltration |
| 37.10.71[.]188 | Used in exfiltration |
| 88.119.167[.]239 | soc.dll command and control |
The advisory also lists four hostnames as IOCs: WIN-SBOE3CPNAL, WIN-3IUUOFVTQAR, WIN-DK18BI83M0S and WIN-I1HRRJHCEIV. It doesn’t say where they were seen. Searching authentication and EDR logs for those workstation names, especially on VPN and RDP logons, costs little.
File hashes
These are the hashes from the advisory’s tables, and they match the STIX bundle. The STIX file adds SHA-1 C13BC01D6630D6E51F5DC3D3B0D90D8D499FF240 and MD5 37C1E6931A14601BB136DF5985BEB0A1 for SharpShares.exe.
SHA-1
07353237350c35d6dc2c8f143b649cd07c71f62b ransomware binary
b498a2683640c983bb069fa2ea9e67cef4a3797d locker.dll (PE32)
bbfed53e3bb1f306f4da97d995cf4ae5b73ad081 locker.dll
d711a5af5aed48a3b36b98f4fcf52809aebef7a2 nxc (NetExec)
SHA-256
921df888aaabcd828a3723f4c9f5fe8b8379c6b7067d16b2ea10152300417eae soc.dll
6c1d36df94ebe367823e73ba33cfb4f40756a5e8ee1e30e8f0ae55d47e220a6a RunPE bundled DLL
e79608cf1d6b51324c14bef8883054c1238ed5f080222cc464810e6e14adc346 injected PE
327b8b61eb446cc4f710771e44484f62b804ae3d262b57a56575053e2df67917 locker.dll (PE32)
a0dc80a37eb7e2716c02a94adc8df9baedec192a77bde31669faed228d9ff526 locker.dll
bbdd3620a67aedec4b9a68b2c9cc880b6631215e129816aea19902a6f4bc6f41 SharpShares.exe
Hashes catch the exact build and nothing else, so push them to your EDR as a retro-hunt rather than sweeping hosts by hand. If you do have to check one host live, something like this works, but bear in mind it reads every file it touches:
$iocs = @(
'921DF888AAABCD828A3723F4C9F5FE8B8379C6B7067D16B2EA10152300417EAE',
'327B8B61EB446CC4F710771E44484F62B804AE3D262B57A56575053E2DF67917',
'A0DC80A37EB7E2716C02A94ADC8DF9BAEDEC192A77BDE31669FAED228D9FF526'
)
Get-ChildItem -Path C:\ProgramData, C:\Users, C:\Windows\Temp -Recurse -File -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue |
Get-FileHash -Algorithm SHA256 |
Where-Object Hash -in $iocs
File names and behaviour
File names are more durable than hashes here, and the advisory’s file table is a good hunt list. The highest-signal ones are dcsync.exe (the advisory calls it high-confidence credential theft), locker.dll, Socks.exe and Socks_werfault.exe (which the advisory says is likely disguised as a Windows process), sharefinder.ps1, SharpShares.exe, nxc.exe, b2.exe, DYRasWtb.exe and 1 - Copy.bat. Also check for svchost.exe outside System32, and for CCleaner turning up on servers. Any file ending .SafePay means encryption has already started.
For behaviour, these are the hunts we’d run first:
- Process creation. Security event 4688 records each new process. The command line is only captured if “Include command line in process creation events” is enabled; Microsoft notes the field is empty by default. Look for PsExec,
rclone,winscp,b2.exeandnxcrunning on servers, and PowerShell runningsharefinder.ps1. - Accounts. Event 4720 (account created) and 4724 (password reset attempt) come from the Audit User Account Management subcategory on DCs, member servers and workstations. A burst of 4724s against ordinary users matches the password-change behaviour the advisory describes. A new account that quickly appears in an admin group matches T1136.
- Directory access. For
dcsync.exe, event 4662 on domain controllers records operations on AD objects, but only where a SACL covers them. Microsoft recommends monitoring operations against thedomainDNSclass. Check your SACLs before you rely on it. - Recovery. Look for the Volume Shadow Copy service being stopped (System log service-state entries, or EDR). Check NAS admin and audit logs for factory resets and logins from hosts that don’t normally manage storage.
- Remote access and exfiltration. Watch for AnyDesk, TeamViewer or ScreenConnect installs that aren’t in your software inventory. Look for large outbound transfers to cloud storage or B2, and for Defender being switched off shortly after an RDP logon.
Mitigations if you can’t patch yet
Patch the edge first: the Cisco remote access VPNs and the SonicWall management interfaces, because that’s the front door the advisory describes. Then do Veeam, because the backups are what SafePay goes after before encrypting. If a fix has to wait, these are the trade-offs:
- Take management and VPN portals off the internet, or restrict them to known source ranges. The advisory recommends blocking unknown origins from reaching remote access services. Cost: remote admins need another path in.
- Require MFA on VPN, webmail and privileged accounts. It blunts the brute force and phished credentials the advisory describes. Cost: enrolment effort, and service accounts that can’t do MFA need compensating controls.
- Isolate Veeam servers from general user networks and rotate the credentials they store. CVE-2023-27532 exposes those credentials. Cost: backup jobs may need firewall rule work.
- Keep backups offline, encrypted and immutable, in more than one segmented location, and test a restore. Cost: storage and someone’s time.
- Disable admin accounts when they aren’t needed and grant just-in-time access, as the advisory suggests. Cost: friction for administrators.
- Segment the network so RDP, SMB and WinRM between workstations and servers are limited. Cost: an inventory of what legitimately needs them.
- Block unapproved remote-access tools with application control. Cost: an exception process.
If you find signs of compromise but nothing is encrypted yet, the advisory’s order is: isolate the affected hosts, scope the intrusion, report it, then evict and harden. Preserve the event logs and VPN logs before you reimage; they’re what will tell you how far the actors got. The agencies don’t encourage paying a ransom.
What is still unknown or disputed
There are a few loose ends in the advisory itself. Its tool table attaches T1550.002 to Mimikatz’s handling of Kerberos tickets, but ATT&CK names T1550.002 Pass the Hash. Another table describes credential dumping under T1560.002, which ATT&CK names Archive via Library. We’ve left both out of the mapping above rather than guess at the intended IDs. The STIX bundle labels one locker.dll hash (a0dc80a3…) as “Lockbit 3.0”. The advisory text doesn’t mention LockBit, so we don’t draw any link between the families.
The advisory doesn’t name sectors, victims, the ransom note’s file name or the hostnames’ origin. Nor does it say which of the five CVEs was used in which intrusions. We’ll update this post if the agencies revise the advisory or publish a new STIX version.
Sources
- #StopRansomware: SafePay Ransomware (AA26-293A)
- AA26-293A STIX indicators (JSON)
- CVE-2020-3259
- CVE-2023-20269
- CVE-2023-27532
- CVE-2024-40711
- CVE-2024-40766
- External Remote Services: T1133
- Exploit Public-Facing Application: T1190
- Brute Force: T1110
- Create Account: T1136
- Bypass User Account Control: T1548.002
- Disable or Modify Tools: T1685
- File Deletion: T1070.004
- Service Execution: T1569.002
- Remote Desktop Protocol: T1021.001
- SMB/Windows Admin Shares: T1021.002
- Windows Remote Management: T1021.006
- Archive via Utility: T1560.001
- Archive via Library: T1560.002
- Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol: T1048
- Exfiltration Over Web Service: T1567
- Data Encrypted for Impact: T1486
- Inhibit System Recovery: T1490
- Pass the Hash: T1550.002
- 4688(S) A new process has been created
- 4720(S) A user account was created
- 4724(S, F) An attempt was made to reset an account's password
- 4662(S, F) An operation was performed on an object
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