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Investigations·12 min read

Qilin ransomware: a profile for Gulf leaders, and what to do in 30 days

Qilin listed two more Gulf organisations in October 2026. Who the group is, what a listing means for your business, and the decisions to make this month.

Researched and drafted with AI assistance · reviewed by Prince

Qilin is a ransomware operation that rents its tools to criminal partners, and in October 2026 it added two more Gulf organisations to its leak site. According to the tracker Ransomware.live, it listed Qatar National Import & Export on 7 October and SkyWorld Air Cargo, which the tracker tags to the UAE, on 19 October. Neither company has confirmed a breach in any source we read. The listings came days after a 6 October analysis by SynThreats. Using data up to 4 October 2026, it counted twelve validated Qilin victims across the Gulf Cooperation Council states: three each in Qatar, Saudi Arabia and Oman, two in the UAE plus one it couldn’t verify, one in Kuwait and none in Bahrain.

Qilin is also one of the busiest ransomware operations in the world. SynThreats counted 2,328 leak-site posts in 103 countries up to 3 October 2026. When we read Ransomware.live’s group page on 4 November, it showed 2,562. This briefing covers what happened, what it means for your organisation and what to decide this month. The technical detail comes at the end.

What this means for your organisation

Start with how Qilin is organised, because it changes what “a Qilin attack” means. It is ransomware-as-a-service (RaaS). A core team builds the encryption software, runs the leak site and negotiates. Independent partners, called affiliates, break into victims and share the ransom. MITRE ATT&CK, the public catalogue of attacker behaviour, calls the core team Water Galura and says it recruits affiliates on Russian cybercrime forums. SynThreats sums up the consequence: “A Qilin listing identifies the payload and the extortion platform, not the intruder.” Two Qilin incidents can be carried out by entirely different people.

Here is what the business faces, in plain terms.

Stolen data, then public exposure. Qilin uses double extortion. The attackers copy data before encrypting it, then demand payment twice: once to unlock the files and once to keep the data off their leak site (MITRE; HC3, the US health sector’s cyber threat centre). In the Qatari listings SynThreats examined, the group’s displayed proof included identity documents, residence permits, student records and internal email. That is a regulatory, customer and staff problem even if every system is restored.

Operations stop, and recovery is a target. MITRE says the encryptor runs on Windows, Linux and VMware ESXi (the software that hosts many companies’ virtual servers). It deletes Windows restore points (shadow copies) and switches off vCenter features that keep virtual machines available. SynThreats adds that Veeam backups are destroyed. Plan for losing servers and backups together.

Pressure beyond the ransom note. Trend Micro saw a denial-of-service option added in April 2025, which it calls triple extortion. SynThreats describes phone and SMS harassment and a “Call Lawyer” legal-pressure service. Expect staff and customers to be contacted.

The money. SynThreats cites a median initial demand of USD 400,000 from the response firm Arete, and a typical range of USD 50,000 to USD 1 million from Halcyon. We haven’t read those firms’ reports, so treat the figures as indicative.

Speed, then delay. SynThreats cites Cisco Talos measuring about six days on average from first access to encryption, and Ransomware.live’s average of 44.9 days between attack and leak-site post. A week isn’t long to notice an intruder. And an October listing may describe an intrusion from August or September.

A listing isn’t proof of a breach. SynThreats says a post is an extortion claim against a victim that didn’t pay by the deadline. For a named organisation, though, the reputational damage arrives either way.

Decisions and actions for the next 30 days

These are in order of urgency. Each one ties back to how the sources say Qilin’s affiliates get in and do damage.

This week

  1. Leadership: get a yes-or-no answer on MFA for every remote access route. SynThreats says the most common way in is a valid account on a VPN or remote desktop service without multi-factor authentication (MFA, a second proof of identity beyond the password), often with credentials bought from criminal markets. It calls MFA on remote access the cheapest control there is. Ask for a list of every VPN, remote desktop gateway and remote-support tool, with its MFA status. Anything without MFA needs your decision: fix it now, or accept the risk in writing.
  2. IT and network teams: check three firewall and VPN products. SynThreats links three 2026 vulnerabilities to Qilin affiliates between June and September 2026, citing Cisco Talos, Arctic Wolf and Check Point. They affect Cisco Secure Firewall Management Center (CVE-2026-20316), the GlobalProtect VPN in Palo Alto Networks PAN-OS (CVE-2026-0257), and remote access VPN on Check Point Quantum Security Gateways and Spark firewalls (CVE-2026-50751). If you run any of them, confirm the patched version this week. Cisco’s record notes the risk is lower when the management interface isn’t reachable from the internet, so take management interfaces off the internet wherever you can.
  3. Security team: find out whether staff passwords are already circulating. SynThreats found all three Qatari victims’ domains in infostealer data (malware that harvests saved browser passwords) before they were listed. If you have a credential-exposure monitoring service, run your domains now and reset whatever turns up, VPN accounts first.

Within two weeks

  1. Backups: prove one restore from an offline copy. Qilin goes after backups, so one that’s always connected may not survive. SynThreats recommends offline backups; Trend Micro recommends the 3-2-1 rule (three copies, two kinds of media, one off-site). Name who owns the test and when it happens.
  2. Endpoint protection: switch on tamper protection, servers included. SynThreats describes affiliates loading a vulnerable signed driver to blind endpoint detection and response (EDR) tools, and other cases where they simply uninstalled the agent. Tamper protection stops the agent being switched off or removed without authorisation.
  3. Logging: get logs off the machine. MITRE and SynThreats both say the encryptor clears Windows event logs. SynThreats recommends forwarding logs centrally in real time and alerting on Security event 1102, which Microsoft says is written every time the Security audit log is cleared and shouldn’t normally be seen.

Within 30 days

  1. Suppliers and managed service providers (MSPs). SynThreats describes affiliates phishing an MSP with a fake ScreenConnect login page and capturing one-time codes. Ask your MSP whether each technician has a named account with MFA, and whether you can see their sessions.
  2. Administrator rights. Trend Micro recommends against excessive administrator rights. MITRE records Qilin pushing scheduled tasks through Group Policy, which needs domain-level rights. Cut down the list of accounts that hold them.
  3. Rehearse the decisions you’ll face. Who decides on a ransom, who handles regulatory notification, who speaks to staff and the press, and which law firm and response firm are on call? Trend Micro advises agreeing business-risk decisions with management in advance. A two-hour tabletop exercise tests it: data stolen, servers and backups encrypted, a leak-site post six weeks later.

Prevention checklist:

  • MFA on every VPN, remote desktop and remote-support route
  • Cisco FMC, PAN-OS GlobalProtect and Check Point remote access patched; management interfaces off the internet
  • Credential-exposure check run, and exposed passwords reset
  • One offline restore tested and signed off
  • EDR tamper protection on, servers included
  • Logs forwarded centrally, with an alert on event 1102
  • MSP access reviewed
  • Domain administrator list reduced
  • Ransomware tabletop exercise held

Who Qilin is, and what it is called

Qilin started out as Agenda. HC3 says it launched under that name in July 2022 and was renamed Qilin by September; Trend Micro also first saw Agenda in July 2022, while SynThreats dates it to August. As of 4 October 2026, SynThreats had found no arrest, sanction or infrastructure seizure.

Publishers use different names, and they don’t always name the same thing. MITRE keeps the ransomware and its operators as separate entries.

PublisherNameWhat the name coversSource and date
MITRE ATT&CKQilin (S1242), alias AgendaThe ransomwareS1242, last modified 23 April 2026
MITRE ATT&CKWater Galura (G1050), associated name GOLD FEATHERThe operators of the Qilin RaaSG1050, last modified 31 July 2026
Trend MicroWater GaluraThe group behind Qilin, formerly Agenda10 October 2025
Trend MicroPhantom Mantis, Gold Feather, STAC4365Listed as related names, without saying who uses each10 October 2025
HHS HC3Qilin, aka AgendaThe group and its ransomware18 June 2024
SynThreatsGOLD FEATHER (credited to Secureworks and Sophos), Phantom Mantis (credited to PRODAFT)Other publishers’ names for the group6 October 2026

We haven’t read Secureworks’, Sophos’ or PRODAFT’s own reports, so those credits come from SynThreats alone. We treat these names as one actor only where MITRE or Trend Micro links them.

Attribution and confidence

None of the sources we read attributes Qilin to a government. Their claims are about language and location, and they are hedged.

  • HC3 (June 2024): “The group likely originates from Russia.” It also noted that the group’s recruitment post excludes the CIS (former Soviet) countries.
  • SynThreats (October 2026): assesses with moderate confidence that the core team is Russian-speaking, citing the CIS exclusion, its presence on the RAMP forum and its Russian-language communications.
  • MITRE (G1050): says the operators recruit affiliates on Russian cybercrime forums.

None of these is a link to a state, and none claims one. Trend Micro cites HC3 as suggesting the group is financially motivated rather than focused on one sector.

The affiliates are a separate question. MITRE records that Moonstone Sleet, which it describes as North Korean-linked, has deployed Qilin, citing Microsoft Threat Intelligence on 6 March 2025. SynThreats lists Scattered Spider (Octo Tempest) and Storm-2570 among the affiliates, and reports that Check Point attributed one Israeli hospital attack to Iran-affiliated operators. We haven’t read the Microsoft or Check Point originals. A state-linked affiliate using Qilin doesn’t make Qilin state-run, and no source here says it does.

Recent Gulf activity, dated

Ransomware.live names the victims. SynThreats describes the earlier Qatari victims without naming them, and so do we.

DateWhat happenedSource
10 Oct 2025A Qatari family-owned holding company listedSynThreats
24 Oct 2025A British-curriculum school owned by that company listed; the group claimed 481 GB, which SynThreats says no source verifiedSynThreats
23 Aug 2026A Qatari oil and gas engineering contractor listed, then relisted on 30 AugustSynThreats
7 Oct 2026Qatar National Import & Export listedRansomware.live, Qatar page
19 Oct 2026SkyWorld Air Cargo listed, tagged UAE, sector “Transportation”Ransomware.live, UAE page

SynThreats assesses with moderate confidence that the two 2025 listings come from one intrusion. Qilin accounts for three of the eight Qatari organisations named on any leak site since October 2025, and none of the eight has confirmed an incident.

Treat the trackers’ country tags with care. Ransomware.live’s UAE page lists nine Qilin victims, but SynThreats found that five of the UAE-tagged entries were companies in the United States, Canada, Singapore and Bangladesh. We haven’t confirmed where SkyWorld Air Cargo is based.

Targets

MITRE says Qilin’s victims are mostly in the United States, France, Canada and the UK, mainly in manufacturing, technology, financial services and healthcare. SynThreats puts the United States at 42.2% of posts, with manufacturing (21.1%) and professional services leading the sectors. In the Gulf, SynThreats expects more Qilin claims against Qatari organisations within twelve months, mostly mid-market private firms such as contractors, education providers and holding companies. That is its forecast, not an observation.

All of this follows what is visible. Leak sites show only victims who didn’t pay, and vendors report what their own customers and telemetry reveal.

What is not yet known or disputed

  • Whether either October victim was breached. Neither has commented in any source we read, and we don’t know how either intrusion began.
  • When Qilin started. HC3 and Trend Micro say July 2022; SynThreats says August 2022.
  • How many victims there are. SynThreats counted 2,328 posts up to 3 October and Ransomware.live showed 2,562 on 4 November. The dates and counting methods differ, and neither figure includes victims who paid.
  • The Gulf count. SynThreats’ twelve is a validated figure; the raw tracker pages give different numbers.
  • The 2026 vulnerabilities. SynThreats’ links between the three CVEs and Qilin rest on Cisco Talos, Arctic Wolf and Check Point reports we haven’t read. The CVE records don’t mention Qilin.
  • Gulf government reporting. None of the sources we read is a Gulf government advisory on Qilin.

Technical annex

Techniques, mapped to ATT&CK

We checked each ID on attack.mitre.org.

IDTechniqueWhat Qilin or its affiliates doSource
T1078Valid AccountsLog in with stolen or bought credentialsSynThreats
T1133External Remote ServicesEnter through VPN and remote desktop without MFASynThreats
T1190Exploit Public-Facing ApplicationExposed Citrix and RDP (MITRE); the 2026 edge-device CVEs (SynThreats)MITRE S1242; SynThreats
T1003.001LSASS MemoryDump credentials with an embedded Mimikatz moduleMITRE S1242
T1685.005Clear Windows Event LogsClear Windows event logsMITRE S1242; SynThreats
T1567.002Exfiltration to Cloud StorageUpload staged data with Rclone, MEGA and BackblazeSynThreats
T1490Inhibit System RecoveryDelete shadow copies; disable HA and DRS in vCenterMITRE S1242
T1486Data Encrypted for ImpactAES-256 or ChaCha20, with keys protected by RSAMITRE S1242

On cve.org, CVE-2026-20316 is a static low-privilege credential in the Cisco FMC web interface, exploited from July 2026 according to Cisco. CVE-2026-0257 is a GlobalProtect authentication bypass under specific configurations. CVE-2026-50751 lets an attacker open a Check Point VPN connection without a valid password over the deprecated IKEv1 protocol. Take fixed versions from each record and the vendor advisory.

Detection and hunting

Behaviour first. MITRE describes a scheduled task named TVInstallRestore that mimics TeamViewer, and a payload named TeamViewer_Host_Setup. SynThreats adds a %TEMP%\QLOG\ folder, C:\PerfLogs\win.exe, a side-loaded msimg32.dll that loads the driver rwdrv.sys, and ransom notes named README-RECOVER-<id>.txt. Also watch for event 1102, unfamiliar remote-management tools (AnyDesk, ScreenConnect, Splashtop, MeshAgent), PsExec on servers and large uploads to cloud storage. SynThreats reports that Cisco Talos published 12 Sigma and YARA rules on 2 April 2026; we haven’t read them.

Indicators

We don’t reproduce indicators here. SynThreats’ 6 October 2026 analysis lists nine, including leak-site addresses, IP addresses, command-and-control domains and driver hashes. None of the sources we read offers an authoritative CSV or STIX file. SynThreats notes that encryptor hashes differ for each victim and that attacker IP addresses sit on reused rented servers. Indicators go stale quickly: treat any list as a starting point, check its date, and rely on the behaviour-based hunts above.

Sources

  1. Qilin Ransomware: Global Operations & Attacks on Qatar — SynThreats · accessed
  2. ランサムウェア「Qilin」を操る攻撃者グループ「Water Galura」とは? — Trend Micro · accessed
  3. TLP Clear HC3 Threat Profile: Qilin, aka Agenda Ransomware (18 June 2024) — US HHS Health Sector Cybersecurity Coordination Center (HC3), via the American Hospital Association · accessed
  4. Qilin, Software S1242 — MITRE ATT&CK · accessed
  5. Water Galura, Group G1050 — MITRE ATT&CK · accessed
  6. Moonstone Sleet, Group G1036 — MITRE ATT&CK · accessed
  7. Qilin group page — Ransomware.live · accessed
  8. Qatar country page — Ransomware.live · accessed
  9. United Arab Emirates country page — Ransomware.live · accessed
  10. CVE-2026-20316 — CVE Program (CNA: Cisco) · accessed
  11. CVE-2026-0257 — CVE Program (CNA: Palo Alto Networks) · accessed
  12. CVE-2026-50751 — CVE Program (CNA: Check Point) · accessed
  13. Valid Accounts: T1078 — MITRE ATT&CK · accessed
  14. External Remote Services: T1133 — MITRE ATT&CK · accessed
  15. Exploit Public-Facing Application: T1190 — MITRE ATT&CK · accessed
  16. OS Credential Dumping: LSASS Memory: T1003.001 — MITRE ATT&CK · accessed
  17. Disable or Modify Tools: Clear Windows Event Logs: T1685.005 — MITRE ATT&CK · accessed
  18. Exfiltration Over Web Service: Exfiltration to Cloud Storage: T1567.002 — MITRE ATT&CK · accessed
  19. Inhibit System Recovery: T1490 — MITRE ATT&CK · accessed
  20. Data Encrypted for Impact: T1486 — MITRE ATT&CK · accessed
  21. 1102(S) The audit log was cleared — Microsoft Learn · accessed
  • qilin
  • ransomware
  • gulf
  • threat-actor-profile
  • double-extortion

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